

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY DOHA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0601

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 DOHA 0751

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OGEN, AFSP, QA, US

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT: QATAR 1975

REF: 3 FAM 212.4; STATE 002050

1. SUMMARY: CENTRAL US OBJECTIVE IN QATAR IS TO INFLUENCE DISPOSITION OF COUNTRY'S OIL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO SERVE US NATIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS. ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE DEPENDS ON SUCCESSFUL US CATALYZATION OF MID EAST SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS. US-QATARI POLICY ISSUES ARE MID EAST SETTLEMENT AND ENERGY/NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER ISSUE. WHILE WE WORK TOWARD SETTLEMENT, WE CAN DEAL WITH THESE POLICY ISSUES AND SUPPORT OUR OBJECTIVES BY GREATLY IMPROVED CONSULTATION PROCEDURES; EXCHANGE OF HIGH LEVEL VISITS, MOST IMPORTANTLY INVITING AMIR TO U.S. AND VISIT BY SECRETARY TO QATAR; QUICKER RESPONSES TO QATARI REQUESTS; IMPROVED HANDLING OF STUDENTS; PROVIDING ENGLISH TEACHERS; AND FURTHER ENHANCING US PRESENCE IN COUNTRY. EMBASSY'S FUNDING REQUIREMENTS FOR FYS 76-77 ARE MODEST INCREASE OVER PRESENT LEVEL AND BARE BONES ESTIMATE. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE ANOTHER OFFICER IN FY-76 AND A DCM IN INDETERMINATE FUTURE. USIS OFFICE WITH LOCAL EMPLOYEE IN CHARGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FY-76 IF PAO POSITION ESTABLISHED IN BAHRAIN. END SUMMARY.

2. CENTRAL US OBJECTIVE IN QATAR IS TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE OVER DISPOSITION OF QATAR'S OIL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES SO THAT THEY SERVE US NATIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERESTS IN OUR QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.

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3. ALL OTHER US OBJECTIVES, INTERESTS AND GOALS ARE SUPPORTIVE

OF AND DERIVATIVE FROM THIS CENTRAL OBJECTIVE. THEY INCLUDE:

(A) PROMOTION OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF US POLICIES, PARTICULARLY TOWARD MID EAST AND ENERGY/WORLD ECONOMIC STABILITY ISSUE THROUGH DEEPENED RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF GOQ.

(B) EXPANSION OF US TRADE, SHARE OF US FIRMS IN MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES, AND QATARI INVESTMENT IN U.S.

(C) REGIME COMPATIBLE WITH US INTERESTS AND WHICH IS CONTRIBUTOR TO REGIONAL STABILITY.

(D) PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS.

(E) ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEST MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP.

(F) PROMOTION OF DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF US ITSELF--SOCIAL DYNAMICS, COUNTRY'S PERSONALITY--THROUGH GREATER EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL VISITORS, BUSINESS VISITORS, FACILITATION OF QATARI STUDENTS ENTERING US HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS, ETC. PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ENCOURAGING MORE QATARIS TO VISIT U.S. RELATIVELY VERY FEW QATARIS HAVE VISITED U.S. THEY DON'T KNOW OUR COUNTRY OR US, AND THIS IS MAJOR HANDICAP IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THEM.

4. ACHIEVEMENT OF US CENTRAL OBJECTIVE AND ALL RELATED INTERESTS DEPENDS ON US SUCCESS IN BRINGING ABOUT MID EAST SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS. GOQ OFFICIALS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS HAVE INDICATED THAT ALL PHASES OF OUR RELATIONS WILL BE IN RESERVED ATMOSPHERE UNTIL WE "DO RIGHT" BY ARABS IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS SPECIFIC EVIDENCE BEARING OUT THIS RESERVE: GOQ HAS PERCENTAGE LIMIT ON AMOUNT OF ITS SURPLUS FUNDS THAT CAN BE INVESTED IN US; GOVERNMENT SHIED AWAY FROM OUR OFFER OF URGENTLY NEEDED EXPERT IN HOUSING FIELD; REQUEST FOR US NAVAL SHIP VISIT WAS DECLINED; A NUMBER OF US FIRMS SEEKING PROJECTS HERE HAVE TOLD US THAT ESR MID EAST POLICY HAS WEIGHED AGAINST THEM IN COMPETITION. WE BELIEVE THIS SITUATION WILL EASE GRADUALLY RATHER THAN DRAMATICALLY, IF MID EAST CRISIS SETTLEJI UNDER US AUSPICES. ON OTHER HAND, IF IN ARAB EYES
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WE FAIL, GOQ WILL MAKE REASSESSMENT WHICH CANNOT BUT HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON US OBJECTIVES.

5. ON INTERNAL SIDE, WE DO NOT RPT NOT SEE DEVELOPMENTS THAT WILL BASICALLY AFFECT OUR OBJECTIVE OF HAVING COMPATIBLE REGIME WHICH IS CONTRIBUTOR TO REGIONAL STABILITY. RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF QATAR AND ITS PEOPLE HAVE PUT STRAINS ON TRADITIONAL SHAYKHLY METHODS OF RULE. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT PRECLUDE THAT PRESENT

REGIME COULD BE DISPLACED, IT APPEARS AT THIS WRITING THAT POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR REGIMES WOULD ALSO BE COMPATIBLE WITH US INTERESTS AND WELL-DISPOSED TOWARD REGIONAL STABILITY, UNLESS THERE IS UNLIKELY VIOLENTLY RADICAL TAKEOVER. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN A COMPATIBLE SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD LOOK AT US THROUGH SAME EYES AS INCUMBENT REGIME, I.E. WITH RESERVE UNTIL WE PRODUCE ACCEPTABLE MID EAST SETTLEMENT.

6. KEY POLICY ISSUES FACING US IN QATAR OVER NEXT TWO YEARS ARE SETTLEMENT OF MID EAST CRISIS AND ENERGY/NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER ISSUES; FORMER, OF COURSE, CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DIVORCED FROM LATTER. RE MID EAST SETTLEMENT, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE THIS SINE QUA NON FOR ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES IN QATAR. GOQ HAS APPLAUDED AND SUPPORTED US EFFORTS TO DATE, BUT WE HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED FOR OUR SLOWNESS TO PERCEIVE THAT OUR REAL INTERESTS IN AREA LIE WITH ARABS, NOT ISRAEL. QATARIS REGARD ARAB POSITION AS UNASSAILABLY REASONABLE, AND FAULT US FOR NOT EMBRACING IT AND BRINGING ISRAELIS INTO LINE. THEY ALSO RECEIVE INTERNAL PRESSURES ON U.S. POLICY FROM CONGRESS AND FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS, AND URGE US TO MOVE QUICKLY LEST THESE ELEMENTS BOG OUR POLICY DOWN. ENERGY POLICY AND PARALLEL CALL FOR "NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER" ALSO MAY BE ISSUES BETWEEN US. RE ENERGY, GOQ ALMOST TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON REVENUE FROM OIL AND ACUTELY AWARE THAT ITS RESOURCE IS FINITE. ALTHOUGH PASSIVE MEMBER, GOQ FULLY SUPPORTS OPEC POLICY LINE, IS INTENT TO MAXIMIZE ITS REVENUES, AND GENERALLY VIEWS U.S. AS COMPLETELY SELF-CENTERED ON ENERGY ISSUE, OUT TO BUST BOTH PRICES AND OPEC. RE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER, QATARIS ARE SQUARELY IN LDC C MP IN GENERALLY ADVOCATING RECTIFICATION OF ALLEGED LONG TIME ECONOMIC TILT IN FAVOR OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, QATARIS SUPPORT PRODUCER/CONSUMER AND DC/LDC DIALOGUE, BUT WITHIN CONTEXT OF SOLEMN DECLARATION AT ALGIERS SUMMIT. RELATED TO ENERGY POLICY IS GOQ'S SHARP

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ANNOYANCE WITH THREATS TO INVADE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS EMANATING FROM HIGHEST CIRCLES IN USG. ALTHOUGH QATARIS HAVE APPARENTLY ACCEPTED PRESIDENT'S EFFORT TO LAY THIS ISSUE TO REST, THREATS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY HAD NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS.

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7. WITHIN CONTEXT OF US OBJECTIVES, WE MAKE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS ON COURSES OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH US-QATARI POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS:

(A) ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO CATALYZE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. RECENT FORD-SADAT SUMMIT AND CONSULTATIONS WITH RABIN AND KHADDAM HAVE AGAIN RAISED HOPES THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE. WE SHOULD KEEP GOQ CLOSELY INFORMED AS OUR NEXT POLICY INITIATIVE EVOLVES, SO THAT IT WILL HAVE BASIS FOR ACCURATE JUDGMENT IF DIFFICULTIES ARISE. ARAB PARTICIPANTS IN NEGOTIATIONS KEEP GOQ WELL BRIEFED AND THERE COULD BE DISADVANTAGE TO US IN HAVING SR VIEWS CONVEYED VIA THE ARAB SIDE. RE ENERGY POLICY AND NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER ISSUE, SECRETARY'S IEA AND OECD SPEECHES WERE PERCEIVED AS SOFTENING OF US STANCE VIS-A-VIS PRODUCERS' AND LDC CONCERNs. AGAIN, CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH GOQ, PREFERABLY IN ADVANCE, ON US POLICY INITIATIVES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR GOALS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE SHOULD CEASE AND DESIST FROM INVASION THREATS AGAINST OIL PRODUCERS.

(B) ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAT US CAN TAKE TO SUPPORT OUR GENERAL POLICY OBJECTIVES INCLUDE:

(1) MORE ADVANCED POLICY GUIDANCE ON MID EAST CRISIS AND ENERGY WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER ISSUE. "AFTER THE SPEECH" EXPLANATIONS ARE NOT RPT NOT EFFECTIVE. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AT LEAST GENERALLY BRIEF GOQ ON ISSUES WHICH ARE OF GREAT CONCERN TO IT, SUCH AS MID EAST AND ENERGY, BEFORE MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS ARE MADE. WE SHOULD DO MUCH MORE TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONSULTATION BY ASKING QATARIS FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR VIEWS AND REQUESTING THEIR ASSISTANCE IN FURTHERING OUR GOALS. OUR ATTENTION TO THEM IN THIS WAY WOULD BE FLATTERING, SHOULD PRODUCE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE, AND SHOULD MAKE MORE CREDIBLE OUR CONSTANT ASSERTIONS OF INTEREST IN THIS AREA.

(2) VISITS -- THERE SHOULD BE MORE EXCHANGES OF HIGH LEVEL VISITS, MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS INVITATION FOR THE AMIR TO VISIT THE US. WE HAVE FENDED OFF BROAD HINTS FOR INVITATION TO POINT OF EMBARRASSMENT. AMIR SHOULD BE INVITED FOR SOME TIME DURING 1976 AT LATEST, AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY INFORMAL INVITATION WITHOUT FIXING DATES SOONEST. TYPE OF VISIT SHOULD CONFORM TO THAT PLANNED FOR OTHER VISITING GULF RULERS. FROM US SIDE, GOQ OF COURSE CONTINUES TO EXPECT THAT SECRETARY WILL TOUR GULF. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, GOQ'S NOSE WOULD BE WAY OUT OF JOINT IF SECRETARY VISITED ANY GULF STATE, INCLUDING KUWAIT, WITHOUT ALSO VISITING QATAR. OF COURSE, OTHER TOP RANKING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, SUCH AS UNDER SECYS SISCO, ROBINSON AND ASST SECY ATHERTON, WOULD ALSO BE WARMLY RECEIVED. VISITS DURING PAST YEAR OF NEA DEPUTY ASST SECY SOBER, TREASURY ASST SECY PARSKY AND SENATORS PERCY, ABOUREZK AND FULBRIGHT, WERE ALL VERY MUCH APPRECIATED AND ENHANCED US PRESENCE HERE. FROM QATARI SIDE, INVITATIONS TO US FOR MINISTER OF FINANCE AND PETROLEUM AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

(3) QUICKER RESPONSES TO INFORMAL QATARI REQUESTS -- IT HAS TAKEN US MORE THAN SIX MONTHS TO ANSWER GOQ QUERY ON POSSIBILITY OF US SUPPLYING MODEST QUANTITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AND WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR COMPLETE DATA TO MAKE PRESENTATION. A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AVAILABILITY OF USED CARGO AIRCRAFT TOOK THREE MONTHS. THE GOQ SHELVED THE LATTER REQUEST, AND WE ARE NOT SURE HOW IT WILL REACT WHEN WE FINALLY PRODUCE A BELATED ANSWER ON ARMS. WE SENSE THAT WITH THESE AND OTHER REQUESTS THAT THE GOQ IS TESTING OUR REACTION TIME AS INDICATIVE OF OUR INTEREST IN BEING OF ASSISTANCE. WE WILL HAVE TO DO MUCH BETTER TO CONVINCE THEM OF OUR INTEREST AND TO MEET COMPETITION FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

(4) MORE EFFICIENT HANDLING OF QATARI STUDENTS GOING TO U.S. -- THERE ARE NOW MORE THAN 150 QATARI STUDENTS AT US INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING. WITH EMBASSY'S SUPPORT, CONFIDENTIAL

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AFME IS HOPEFUL OF LANDING A CONTRACT FOR HANDLING OF QATARI STUDENTS IN US, AND THIS WILL GREATLY IMPROVE SITUATION. WE INTEND, WITH APPROPRIATE USIS SUPPORT, TO OFFER MORE IN WAY OF PREDEPARTURE COUNSELING AND ORIENTATION TO QATARI STUDENTS BOUND FOR US.

(5) MORE RESPONSIVENESS IN ASSISTING MINISTRY OF EDUCATION'S ENGLISH TEACHING PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY AT QATAR UNIVERSITY -- UNIVERSITY HAS ASKED US FOR ASSISTANCE IN RECRUITING ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHERS, AND ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT HAVE DONE THEIR BEST, WE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATES FOR POSITIONS HERE. AFME MAY BE HELPFUL

ADDITION IN THIS AREA AS WELL. NEEDLESS TO SAY, PRESENCE AT QATAR U. OF AMERICAN TEACHERS OF ENGLISH WOULD BE IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSITY. FURTHER RE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING PROGRAMS IN THIS COUNTRY, NUMBER OF GOQ OFFICIALS HAVE COMPLAINED TO US ABOUT INADEQUACIES OF BRITISH COUNCIL, WHICH HAS LOCK ON ENGLISH TEACHING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT USIS HAS AGREEMENT WITH BRITISH COUNCIL THAT IT WILL NOT GET INTO LANGUAGE TEACHING BUSINESS WHERE BRITISH COUNCIL ALREADY IN PLACE. WE THINK THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REVIEWED SINCE GOQ APPEARS TO RECOGNIZE SUPERIORITY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH TEACHING METHODS, AND WE COULD USEFULLY CAPITALIZE ON THIS APPRECIATION.

(6) FURTHER RE EXCHANGE OF PERSONS, WE ARE PRESENTLY LIMITED TO THREE INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AND TWO CIP PARTICIPANTS PER YEAR. BECAUSE OF GENERAL ENGLISH LANGUAGE DEFICIENCY HERE, THIS NUMBER IS ADEQUATE FOR THE PRESENT BUT WE SHOULD PLAN ON A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OVER NEXT THREE YEARS. IN ADDITION TO IVS, GOQ HAS INDICATED ITS INTEREST IN SENDING NUMBERS OF PERSONS TO U.S. FOR TRAINING IN VARIOUS TECHNICAL FIELDS AT ITS OWN EXPENSE. SOME OF THIS TRAINING WOULD HAVE TO BE SET UP AS IT NOT COMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING USIS OR CU PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD HAVE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO SUCH REQUESTS, MANY OF WHICH WILL INCLUDE PERIOD FOR INTENSIVE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING.

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(7) FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF US PRESENCE -- US PRESENCE IN QATAR HAS DEVELOPED WITHIN PAST YEAR FROM SIMPLE PRESENCE TO VISIBLE AND OPERATIONAL ONE. RESIDENT AMBASSADOR WITH FULL STAFF IN PRESENTABLE PREMISES HAS INCREASED OUR PHYSICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT. WE HAVE READY ACCESS TO AMIR AND TOP OFFICIALS, AND HAVE DEVELOPED WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS IN

COMMERCIAL AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL AREAS. WITH CONTINUED LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUESTED BELOW, WE CAN MOVE OUT FURTHER INTO COMMUNITY. WE HAVE FOUND, HOWEVER, THAT LOW KEY RATHER THAN AGGRESSIVE APPROACH HAS BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE IN ESTABLISHING RECOGNIZED US PRESENCE IN COUNTRY. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A BASE AND NOW MUST BUILD UPON IT.

8. DOHA'S FUNDING REQUIREMENTS ARE SET FORTH IN EMBASSY FIELD BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 1976-77 (DOHA A-14 FO MAY 17, 1975). THEY ARE PROJECTION OF POST'S NEEDS, REPRESENT ONLY MODEST INCREASE OVER FY-75 (\$469,203 - FY 76 VERSUS \$431,300 - FY 75), AND ARE BARE BONES ESTIMATE. WITH EXCEPTIONS NOTED BELOW, IT IPSEMBASSY'SIVIEW THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF MISSION ARE ADEQUATELY STAFFED AND WILL BE ADEQUATELY FUNDED IF ALLOTMENTS ARE FORTHCOMING IN ACCORDANCE WITH BUDGET ESTIMATES AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

9. RE PROJECTED STAFFING NEEDS, EMBASSY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL OFFICER DURING FY-76. OFFICER COULD BE ASSIGNED AS CONSULAR OFFICERZN FSO GENERAL, OR UNDER REVIVED CENTRAL COMPLEMENT CONCEPT. PERSON SHOULD BE OF JUNIOR RANK (FSO 6-8) AND, IDEALLY, HAVE ENOUGH ARABIC FOR 2/2 RATING. CONSULAR DUTIES WOULD OCCUPY ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF TIME AND WOULD RELEASE FSR PRESENTLY IN CONSULAR SLOT TO DEVOTE FULL TIME TO OTHER DUTIES. REMAIN-
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DER OF TIME WOULD BE UTILIZED TO RELIEVE HEAVY WORK LOADS OF ADMIN AND ECON/COMM OFFICERS, TO EXPAND REPORTING FROM INCREASINGLY INFORMATIVE LOCAL PRESS, AND TO DO OTHER ROUTINE REPORTING TASKS. ASSIGNMENT WOULD COMBINE ADVANTAGES OF PROVIDING EMBASSY WITH UTILITY PERSON, GIVING A NEW OFFICER AN EXCELLENT INITIAL TRAINING ASSIGNMENT WHILE ALLOWING PRESENT CONSUL TO DEVOTE FULL TIME TO OTHER DUTIES. ESTIMATED COST OF ADDING SUCH OFFICER TO STAFF IS \$35 TO \$40 THOUSAND.

10. SHOULD MID EAST SETTLEMENT BE ACHIEVED, AND IF EMBASSY'S THINKING ACCURATE, TEMPO OF OUR ACTIVITIES SHOULD MEASURABLY INCREASE AS GOQ RELAXES RESERVE ON RELATIONS. IN THIQ EVENT, EMBASSY WILL REQUIRE DCM, PREFERABLY AN FSO-4 ARABIST WITH ECONOMIC/PETROLEUM REPORTING EXPERIENCEV TIMING, OF COURSE, DEPENDS ON SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS, AND HOPEFULLY THIS NEED WILL ARISE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. ESTIMATED COST FOR THIS SLOT, ABOUT \$40 THOUSAND.

11. AS DEPT AWARE, DOHA DEPENDS ON USIS OFFICER FROM KUWAIT TO COVER INFORMATION/CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. SHOULD THIS OFFICER BE MOVE D TO BAHRAIN AS RECOMMENDED, WE REQUEST THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING USIS OFFICE AT EMBASSSS DOHA STAFFED BY LOCAL EMPLOYEE. ALTHOUGH ABSORPTPHN CAPACITY OF QATAR FOR USIS

PROGRAMS PRESENTLY LIMITED BY ENGLISH LANGUAGE DEFICIENCES,
WE BELIEVE THAT INCREASED ATTENTION TO DOHA THAT WILL RESULT
FROM USIS PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN WILL REQUIRE A PERMANENT LOCAL
SUPPORT FACILITY. AS IT IS NOW, EMBASSY'S WORKLOAD PERMITS ALMOST
NO TIME IN SUPPORT OF USIS PROGRAMS WHEN USIS OFFICER NOT RPT NOT
PHYSICALLY PRESENT. WE WOULD ENVISAGE LOCAL EMPLOYEE AT FSL-2
LEVEL, SALARY APPROXIMATELY \$12,000 PER YEAR, WITH COST OF
ESTABLISHING AND FURNISHING OFFICE AT ABOUT \$8,000.

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